INTRODUCTION
In line w ith the orthodox consensus on m acroeconom ic policies, the governm ents of m ost subSaharan A frican countries have pursued, since the late 1980s, 'floating' exchange-rate regim es, w hich have been m anaged by central banks. A n alleged benefit-and often the central goal-of this policy regim e has been to achieve international com petitiveness and an associated im provem ent in the efficiency w ith w hich dom estic resources are allocated.
Supporting this policy regim e is Neoclassical trade theory, in w hich trade is assum ed to be based upon prim ary factor endow m ents. Problem atically, the theory, and the policy derived from it, has tended to ignore circum stances in w hich trade is derived from natural resource endow m ents-as is often the case in sub-Saharan A frican countries.
H ow ever, in the 2000s, governm ents of countries w ith large m ineral exports confronted the unexpected problem of nom inal exchange-rate appreciation. This phenom enon w as m ost pronounced in petroleum -exporting countries, but it w as also the experience of exporters of other natural resources. Zam bia's experience in this regard has been a striking case in point.
During the second half of 2005, Zam bia's Kw acha appreciated dram atically against all m ajor currencies (see Figure 1 ). The appreciation resulted from a rapid rise in the w orld dem and for copper, confirm ed by a dram atic increase in its price. A s a result of boom ing w orld dem and, Zam bia's trade balance changed from deficit to surplus (Figure 2 ). This sudden appreciation generated a dom estic debate on its causes and consequences. W hile no international financial organisation expressed concern over the fiscal consequences of exchange-rate m ovem ents in Zam bia, the private sector did (Fynn and H aggbale 2006) . A gricultural and m anufacturing exporters focused on the im pact of appreciation on Zam bia's international com petitiveness.
A m ong som e donors, there w as concern about the im plications for the dom estic purchasing pow er of official developm ent assistance. 1 Since the appreciation arose from the boom in dem and for a natural resource, speculation intensified that Zam bia w ould succum b to the copper equivalent of the 'Dutch Disease' (Calí and te Velde, 2007; Corden and Neary 1982), w ith a consequent decline of its other com m odity producing sectors. Table 1 The national debate focused on the production of tradables, export com petitiveness and dom estic im port substitutes, w ith only passing reference to the fiscal effects. In response to this oversight, this Country Study has attem pted to assess the fiscal effects of appreciation, especially because such effects are likely to occur in a significant num ber of other countries that export prim ary com m odities.
A t issue is the fiscal capacity of the Zam bian governm ent to achieve its 2007 developm ent plan, w hich stresses increasing grow th, reducing poverty and achieving the M illennium Developm ent G oals (M DG s) (W eeks et al. 2006).
W hile currency appreciation is a com m on outcom e of com m odity price fluctuations, Zam bia's situation has had several unusual aspects. First, the suddenness and size of the appreciation at the end of 2005 had no precedent in the country's history, and is extrem ely rare in sub-Saharan A frica. Therefore, there is little relevant experience in designing and im plem enting appropriate and effective policies in such a context. Second, international experience suggests that Zam bia could be the first aid-dependent country to experience m ore than m inor appreciation of its currency (IM F 2005) . This characteristic m akes a case study focused on the im pact of appreciation on developm ent assistance and, m ore generally, on public revenue an im portant undertaking.
Third, the dram atic appreciation occurred in the context of external policy conditionalities predicated on currency w eakness, slow grow th and inflationary pressures. These assum ptions contrasted w ith the actual situation of accelerating grow th and falling inflation. Due, in great part, to the currency appreciation, inflation fell, for instance, from an average of over 18 per cent in 2005 to less than 10 per cent in 2006. 2 Fourth, large currency appreciations are typically associated w ith large inflow s of export earnings, m ost fam ously in petroleum -exporting countries. Because of the com m on com bination of appreciation and a boom in public revenue, little attention has been given to revenue effects, except as a contributor to the so-called Dutch Disease.
In Zam bia's case, how ever, the appreciation w as not accom panied by a significant increase in public revenue from copper because of the extrem ely favourable tax breaks enjoyed by the privatised copper sector. Rem oving such unjustified favouritism should be, of course, a top priority for Zam bian policym akers.
The purpose of this Country Study is to identify policy lessons that could guide other countries in sub-Saharan A frica, as w ell as elsew here, in m anaging the effects of m ajor appreciations of exchange rates that are not accom panied by com pensating increases in International Poverty Centre 5 public revenue. Therefore, Section 2 presents a sim ple fram ew ork for estim ating exchangerate effects w hile Section 3 calculates the fiscal effect. The final section suggests policy m easures-w hich are both specific to Zam bia and m ore general in applicability-w hich could be used to counter such an effect.
A NA LY TICA L B A CK G ROUND A ND COUNTRY CONTEX T
Though it is obvious that exchange-rate changes w ould have effects on both public expenditures and revenue, there is in the econom ic literature an alm ost total absence of an exam ination of this subject. This om ission is all the m ore surprising because of the considerable attention given to the reverse causality, nam ely, the im pact of the fiscal balance on exchange rates. 3 The standard fram ew ork for analysing the interaction of fiscal policy and exchange-rate m ovem ents, i.e., the M undell-Flem ing m odel, does not consider the im pact of the exchange rate on the fiscal balance except via m ultiplier effects.
The relationship can be organised analytically by the follow ing definitions:
W here FB is the fiscal balance, E is public expenditure and R public revenue, w ith E and R each divided betw een those item s affected by the exchange rate (noted by subscript x) and those unaffected by the exchange rate (noted by subscript d).
For expenditures, the m ost im portant item affected by the exchange rate w ould be external debt paym ents. Because of data lim itations in the em pirical w ork below , w e ignore other possible exchange-rate affected expenditures, such as public-sector im ports.
On the revenue side, there are tw o im portant elem ents, i.e., trade taxes and external public-sector grants and loans. Therefore, w e can conclude: E = E d + e(rD + αD), and
W here e is the exchange rate. For the expenditure definition, r is the average interest rate on external debt, D is the stock of external debt and α is the required repaym ent of principal each period. For revenue, X, M and K are the foreign-currency values of exports, im ports and official capital flow s, and t 1 and t 2 are the average tax rates on the first tw o item s. If the interest rate on external debt and the tax rates are constant, the im pact of a change in the exchange rate on the fiscal balance is:
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The sym bols m and x are the partial derivatives of im ports and exports w ith respect to the exchange rate, the first being positive and the second negative. For the calculations in the next section, w e ignore export taxes and the im pact of changes in the nom inal exchange rate on the quantity of im ports and exports. The exclusion of the form er is sensible because export taxes w ere assessed in Kw acha values, w hich the nom inal exchange rate w ould not affect directly. Therefore, the exchange-rate effect reduces to:
In the em pirical estim ates of the exchange-rate effect, actual values w ill be com pared to a counterfactual outcom e (∆FB*), in w hich the Kw acha-Dollar rate rem ains constant:
In sum m ary, an appreciation of the exchange rate im proves the fiscal balance through its im pact on debt service paym ents, and w orsens it through its effect on the Kw acha valuation of im ports and Official Developm ent A ssistance. There could also be an indirect effect through the dom estic price level, w hich is also considered below .
EFFECTS OF A PPRECIA TION ON FISCA L SPA CE

TH E COUNTRY CONTEXT
Before presenting calculations of the fiscal im pact of the exchange rate, w e consider its policy significance. Once a governm ent has established its budget by specifying expenditures, taxes and expected incom e from abroad, several variables can cause the actual outcom e to differ from the program m ed outcom e. W ith respect to the external factors that affect the budget, governm ents can exert influence on their im pact through the exchange rate.
The purpose of our calculations is to assess w hether m anaging the exchange rate w ould have a significant effect on fiscal space. To carry out such an exercise, w e need to specify a counterfactual scenario in w hich the policy-m anaged exchange rate differs from the actual one.
Specifying the counterfactual requires a choice of the Kw acha rate to w hich the actual exchange rate w ould be com pared. A practical approach w ould be to choose the exchange rate upon w hich the Zam bian governm ent w ould have based its budgetary planning for 2005 and subsequently. . This represents a difference of less than five per cent, w ith a coefficient of variation of 1.5 per cent. In our calculations, w e assum e that the governm ent w ould use this average for this period for its 2005 fiscal planning. 4 On this assum ption, w e can estim ate the three m ajor fiscal effects of the appreciation: 1) trade taxes (the VA T on im ports and tariffs); 2) external assistance (grants and loans); and 3) servicing of the external debt. W ith the data available, it w as not possible to estim ate the im pact on the im port content of public non-debt expenditures, but this w as likely to be sm all. 5 International Poverty Centre 7 W e also ignored the exchange-rate im pact on direct foreign investm ent because it had no direct revenue effects. This im pact could have had im portant m onetary im plications but this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
To begin the analysis of the fiscal im pact of changes in the exchange rate in Zam bia, Table 2 presents Table 2 show s that revenue increased, though m ost of the increase w as due to inflation. The question that w e address is: w hat m ight public revenue have been had the Kw acha not appreciated? On the basis of a m ore detailed breakdow n of revenues, w e can calculate a counterfactual revenue and exchange-rate scenario. Table 3 The general point is that such a borrow ing lim it m ade no sense in the Zam bian context. W hether the lim it w as breeched or over-achieved w as, in great part, beyond the control of the governm ent w hen the exchange rate w as allow ed to float. W hen the IM F recom m ended that the governm ent continue its policy of an exchange-rate float, it m ade no m ention of any fiscal effect. 11 
TH E LOSS OF FISCA L SPA CE
TH E COST OF M ONEY-SUPPLY RESTRICTIONS
Because the budget lim it w as part of a broader policy of m onetary restraint, the borrow ing lim it contributed, in effect, to exchange-rate appreciation-and, therefore, to breeching the lim it itself.
A long w ith the lim it on public borrow ing, the IM F set m oney-supply lim its, w hich prevented any effective intervention by the Bank of Zam bia to m oderate the appreciation of the Kw acha.
The recognised, orthodox w ay to m oderate an appreciation w ould be for a central bank to purchase foreign exchange from the dom estic private sector. These currency transactions w ould directly signal the exchange rate that the central bank sought to m aintain, and w ould indirectly reduce pressure for appreciation by increasing the supply of dom estic currency relatively and absolutely to foreign exchange.
By its nature, the purchase of foreign exchange is not a perfect instrum ent, because it increases foreign reserves that via private-sector expectations could strengthen the dom estic currency. H ow ever, except under highly unusual conditions, the expectation effect should be substantially less than the im pact of an increase in the dom estic m oney supply. 
A NA LYTICA L FRA M EW ORK
To analyse these inter-relationships further, w e define the price level as the w eighted sum of the price levels for non-traded and traded com m odities, w ith the w eights determ ined by the im port share in G DP.
W here P d is the price index of non-tradables, P t is the index of tradables, and α is the m arginal propensity to im port. By letting sm all Latin letters stand for percentage rates of change, the expression becom es: H ow ever, purchases or sales of foreign currency affect the exchange rate, so e = χm , w here χ is the elasticity of the exchange rate w ith respect to central bank transactions in foreign exchange. This elasticity is positive (an increase in M causes a devaluation).
A fter substitution, one obtains,
Continuing w ith the naïve quantity theory of m oney, one can assum e that foreign exchange purchases w ould stim ulate inflation less than proportionally to the m oney supply increase that they generate, because 1) the econom y could be at less than full em ploym ent, so that there could be an increase in non-traded output that could absorb part of the additional m oney; 2) the dom estic m arket for tradables m ight not be perfectly com petitive (β is less than unity); and 3) the elasticity of the exchange rate w ith respect to foreign exchange transactions m ight be inelastic (χ is less than unity).
The im port propensity and the 'pass-through rate' for Zam bia in the m id-2000s w ere about 0.3 and 0.5, respectively. 13 The report to the UNDP on the appreciation of the Kw acha estim ated that the elasticity of the nom inal exchange rate w ith respect to foreign exchange purchases w as 0.8 (significant at less than one per cent probability) (W eeks, et al., 2007, Table 4 .1).
To approxim ate the inflationary effect of foreign currency purchases, w e need only to estim ate the output effect. If the increase in output is zero, then the inflationary consequence of a purchase w ould be 0.82(m ), 14 w hich is the m axim um value. H ow ever, the rise in the price of non-traded com m odities should provoke an increase in output. If w e assum e that the output response has a relatively low elasticity of 0.5, the inflation effect w ould be 0.47(m ), or less than one half the increase in the m oney supply that the foreign exchange purchase creates. This estim ate can be com pared to the budgetary effect of the foreign-exchange purchase. A ssum e that the Bank of Zam bia seeks to reduce the appreciation of the Kw acha by 10 per cent (e.g., in the third quarter of 2007 to have had an exchange rate of 4,327 to the U.S. Dollar instead of 3,934). This w ould have required foreign exchange purchases of US$ 41 m illion.
Such purchases w ould have increased foreign exchange holdings by 5.3 per cent and the m oney base (M 1) by 4.6 per cent, im plying at m ost an increase in the price level of 2.2 percentage points. 15 The sam e hypothetical reduction in the appreciation of the Kw acha w ould have contributed plus 1.1 percentage points of G DP to public revenue. 16 This hypothetical exercise dem onstrates the dysfunctional nature of m oney supply lim its and, m ore generally, the restrictions im posed by focusing m onetary policy on targeting low inflation in the short run. W hen public incom e is dependent upon official capital inflow s and trade taxes, the effect of setting m oney supply lim its in the context of currency appreciation is to increase the fiscal deficit, and, therefore, public borrow ing.
If sim ultaneously there is a restriction on public borrow ing, the m oney supply lim it w ill force expenditure reductions by the governm ent by preventing the alternative of intervening in the foreign exchange m arket to counteract appreciation.
SUM M A RY A ND POLICY CONCLUSIONS
Strict and specific policy conditionalities that are im posed by donors and lenders, such as the lim its on the m oney supply described above, can be questioned on m any grounds. M ost fundam entally, they contradict the principle of recipient ow nership of econom ic policy and restrict the policy space of governm ents. W hen, in addition, they generate inconsistent and unintended adverse outcom es, they becom e obstacles to rational policy-m aking.
Zam bia's experience in the m id-2000s provides a clear exam ple of dysfunctional external conditionality that underm ined, in effect, one of the goals of that conditionality, i.e., sound m acroeconom ic m anagem ent.
In the m id-2000s, w hen the price of copper rose rapidly and caused the Kw acha to appreciate, the rational m acroeconom ic policy w ould have been for the Bank of Zam bia to intervene in the foreign exchange m arket to w eaken the dom estic currency, and, thus increase the m oney supply. This w ould have been consistent w ith the international practice of exchange-rate m anagem ent (see Fischer 2001 for a discussion of exchange-rate regim es; see also Buffie et al. 2004 and G hosh et al. 1996) ).
Intervention w ould have fostered the com petitiveness of non-copper exports, as w ell as have increased public revenue. If large purchases had been required, it w ould have been necessary for the Bank of Zam bia to consider the possibility of inflationary effects. A ddressing such a trade-off is, how ever, an inherent accom panim ent of im plem enting all m acroeconom ic policies.
H ow ever, the obviously appropriate policy response of increasing the dom estic m oney supply w as blocked because an IM F program m e com m itted the governm ent to setting strict m oney-supply lim its. H ow ever, because the Bank of Zam bia adhered to the m oney-supply lim its, the governm ent found it difficult to abide by another IM F conditionality, nam ely, lim iting public borrow ing to 0.6 per cent of G DP. 17 International Poverty Centre
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Over 40 years ago the M undell-Flem ing m odel generated the conclusion that fiscal policy w ould not be effective under a floating exchange-rate regim e (M undell 1963). But that m odel ignored exchange-rate effects on public revenue and expenditure. Once these effects are recognised, one has to m ove beyond this standard analysis and recognize that under a floating exchange-rate regim e, m any developing countries w ould necessarily be ineffective in m anagem ent of their fiscal deficits.
In the context of Zam bia's developm ent strategy, this im plies greater difficulty in deploying the expenditures necessary to attain the M illennium Developm ent G oals. This im plies, in turn, the need to re-exam ine the usefulness of floating exchange rates, enforcing strict m oney-supply lim its and setting low inflation targets as a foundation for scaling up fiscal resources to accelerate grow th and hum an developm ent.
